Taiwan cyberwar exercise models attacks on communications and power

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies held the exercise in Taiwan in late September and briefed its findings to President Lai Ching-te and his national security team. The exercise examined how Beijing might seek political concessions without launching an invasion. [1]

The simulated opening phase used localized cellular disruptions, information manipulation and pressure on satellite connectivity. The scenario then escalated to damaged undersea cables and disabled electrical substations supporting telecommunications. [1]

In the exercise, government websites were breached and several international subsea cables were cut, leaving the remaining cable capacity heavily loaded. Microwave and satellite systems were then placed under substantial pressure as backups carried more traffic. [2]

Craig Singleton, who played China in the simulation, said individual incidents such as a cable break, temporary cellular outage or cyber intrusion could be manageable. He argued that the risk increased when those pressures interacted and tested Taiwan’s ability to adapt. [2]

The exercise organizers warned that military and civilian planning gaps could delay assistance to Taiwan during a sustained campaign. The modeled strategy was described as gray-zone pressure: coercion intended to remain below the threshold of open war. [1][2]